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EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF DUAL DISTRIBUTION: A
ROBINSON-PATMAN APPROACH
The increasingly widespread implementation of dual distribution
as a production-distribution technique, coupled with a heightened
awareness of the potential for competitive abuse inherent therein,
has provided impetus to the search for means by which this prac-
tice may effectively be regulated. This comment considers whether
the price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act
might be the appropriate vehicle through which such regulation
could be effectuated.
HISTORICALLY, the independent distributor has been considered the
keystone of the production-distribution chain." In return for a trade
discount he has served as a middleman between the manufacturer
and retailer, assuming bulk storage, sale, and delivery functions for
the former and extending credit to the latter.2 The danger of anti-
trust prosecution inherent in accretions by horizontal, conglomerate,
and vertical acquisitions,3 coupled with the increased need for more
efficient, less costly, methods of operation has, however, generated a
trend towards assimilation of these functions4 through vertical inte-
2 See Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective,
57 COLUM. L. Rav. 1059, 1061 (1957).
2Id.
8 See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
536 (1948); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 60 (1966); cf. FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
'See, e.g., Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966) (jobbers assimilate
wholesale function); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir.
1965) "(retailer assimilates wholesale function); Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp.,
256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (manufacturer assimilates wholesale function).
Vertical integration was recognized in the oil industry as early as 1931, see United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 288, 309-11 (1931), and in the steel industry as early
as 1920, see United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See generally
Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of the Antitrust Laws Upon Combinations of Suc-
cessive Stages of Production and Distribution, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 921, 928-36, 950-51
(1949). See also Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169, 208 (1955): "Wholesalers and retailers no
longer comprised clean-cut separate links between the producer and the ultimate con-
sumer, each responsible for a clearly defined set of duties. Marketing functions became
scrambled, with many permutations and combinations. Many jobbers and brokers
contributed genuine and important services, though assuming only part of the tradi-
tional full-time wholesaler's job. More often there was the contrary trend toward
integration of distributive functions. Manufacturers created their own outlets. Re-
tailers integrated into wholesaling, and wholesaling into retailing, either by outright
ownership or by cooperative arrangements. The number of patterns was legion and
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gration. 5
One product of such integration by manufacturers has been
diverse."; SUBCOMM. No. 4 OF ThE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT
UPON SMALL BUSINESS OF DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND RELATED VERTICAL INTEGRATION, H.R.
REP. No. 1943, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964); Rowe, supra note 1, at 1061.
1 Vertical integration has been variously defined as "the coordination of successive
steps of production or distribution," Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959), or "unified control of more than one suc-
cessive stage in the production or distribution of goods and services," Hale, supra
note 4, at 921. When the term vertical integration is used hereafter that form
known as ownership integration will be intended unless expressly designated otherwise.
Ownership integration, as the term implies, means the nonacquisitional assimilation
by outright ownership of a stage of production or distribution other than that in
which the acquiring company had been engaged. For purposes of analysis there
shall be two types of vertical integration, "ascending" and "descending," the former
being the assimilation of an earlier function, e.g., assimilation by a retailer of the
wholesale function, and the latter the assimilation of a later function.
There are other methods by which integration may be effected, all of which
involve some degree of control short of outright ownership: by contract, see Kessler
& Stern, supra at 3-21; exclusive dealing arrangements, United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 69 F. Supp. 170, 174 (N.D. Ill. 1946), retvd, 332 U.S. 218 (1947); fair trade
statutes, which legalize retail price maintenance, e.g., Miller-Tydings Amendment, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1964); threat of refusal to deal or renew a franchise with those who fail
to conform to certain policies, see United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
But see George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d
Cir. 1960); by creation of subsidiaries which, though made to appear independent, are
in fact controlled by the parent, see Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp.
541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
While there has been considerable litigation over ascending integration by re-
tailers of the wholesale function and by manufacturers of the primary materials
sources, the focus of this comment, because of the nature of the problem considered,
will be descending integration by the manufacturer through assimilation of the
wholesale function.
Vertically integrated firms are, of course, not strangers to the antitrust laws, for
they have frequently been found guilty of activities proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S.
392, 395 (1953); United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932); United
States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1920); United States v. Reading
Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. 111. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949). See generally Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv. 27
(1949); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv.
1289, 1314-21 (1948); Hale, supra note 4; Kessler & Stem, supra. Similarly, the verti-
cally integrated firm has been found guilty of violating § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C, § 2 (1964), see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); United States
v. Columbia Steel Corp., supra; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra;
United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., supra; United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
supra; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra; § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1964), see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E. I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes,
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the development of dual distribution,6 a novel distributive technique
by which the manufacturer sells its product to independent wholesale
distributors while simultaneously competing with those purchasers
through its own division distributors. Though such a relationship
yields certain economic advantages to the manufacturer,7 the in-
herent opportunities for abuse would seem apparent.8 By favoring
its own division, the manufacturer can reduce the competitiveness
of its independent distributors, an approach which in turn may deny
332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.
1962); and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), see FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., supra.
6Dual distribution has received congressional attention since 1953. See generally
STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., PROBLEMS OF
- INDEPENDENT TIRx DEALERS (Comm. Print 1953); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, Competitive Problems of Independent Flat-
Glass Dealers, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); SENATE SELECr COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS,
STUDIES OF DUAL DISTRIBUTION: THE FLAT-GLAss INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 1015, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, NINTH ANNUAL
REPORT, S. RE'.-No. 6, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 2640, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); S. 2641, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); S. 1107, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963);
S. 1108, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 3559, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R.
3562, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House
Select Comm. on Small Business, The Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distri-
bution and Related Vertical Integration, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); S. 1842, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1843, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1844, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1965).
"'Dual Distribution' exists when a vertically integrated firm operates in two
successive stages of production and/or distribution of a good but also sells some of
its output from the first stage to independent firms who then sell in competition with
the supplying firm's second stage operations. Thus the independent is in competition
with his supplier." SUBCOMM. No. 4 OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS,
THE IMPACT UPON SMALL BUSINESS OF DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND RELATED VERTICAL IN-
TEGRATION, H.R. REP. No. 1943, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
Despite a lack of significant judicial recognition, it would appear that dual dis.
tribution has achieved recognition as a competitive distribution technique in a sig-
nificant number of industries. In hearings before a congressional committee repre-
sentatives of more than forty-five different industries testified to the existence of dual
distribution and the anticompetitive effects created by its abuse. See Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Select Comm. On Small Business, supra.
It is generally recognized that there are certain efficiencies inherent in vertical
integration: increased stability of operations resulting from greater coordination;
facility of long range planning due to uniformity of the quality of consumer outlets
and sources of supply; use maximization of plant, equipment, inventory, and personnel;
and reduction of transfer costs. See Kessler & Stem, supra note 5, at 4-8.
8 Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.
1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Kessler
& Stem, supra note 5, at 14: "[T]he ideal allocation of resources from the firm's view-
point may not prove consonant with the optimum allocation of goods and services in
the economic and social system as a whole." See generally D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT xiii-xvii (1964).
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smaller competing manufacturers who are unable to integrate an
efficient, stable avenue of distribution.9 Moreover, the lack of sound
distribution outlets may impede entry into the market by potential
competitors.10 Thus by squeezing the independent wholesale dis-
tributor, the integrated manufacturer creates a lever which can
be used to ensure a desired share of the market-at both the primary
and secondary levels. 1
This abuse of the distribution technique can effectively be elim-
inated under the Sherman Act12 if the market control actually
achieves or is intended to achieve monopolistic proportions,13 regard-
9 See Kessler & Stern, supra note 5, at 14-16; notes 70-74 infra and accompanying
text.10 See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 214-16 (1962); notes .77-78 infra and
accompanying text.
11 See SUBCOMM. No. 4 OF THE HOUSE SLEaCr COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT
UPON SMALL BUSINESS OF DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND RELATED VERTICAL INTEGRATION, SuPra
note 6, at 6-10.
22 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
18 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Although many cases can be cited for the proposition that a corporation can be
guilty of an intercorporate conspiracy with its own subsidiaries, see Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), there is only one case which states, without explanation,
that a division is incapable of an intracorporate conspiracy with the corporation of
which it is a part, Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348, 354 (D.
Del. 1962). The decision is based on a series of cases which hold that a corporation,
cannot conspire with its officers or agents. See Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 865 (1957); Nelson Radio g-
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925
(1953). It would appear, however, that the analogy to corporate subsidiary cases,
supra, where conspiracies have been found, may be more compelling since the differ-
ence between division and subsidiary status is largely one of form. See, e.g., Reines
Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The Deterjet result, however, may, in the ultimate analysis, be preferable, but
for reasons not set forth in the opinion. It has been argued that the courts will
find no conspiracy possible between a division and the corporation of which it is a
part since to do so would subject the corporation to a number of per se rules which
introduce injurious inflexibility into intracorporate relationships. Moreover, it may
be felt that application of § 1 would usurp the function of § 2 which is designed to
deal with the single enterprise. See Kessler & Stern, supra note 5, at 90. The avail-
ablity of this alternative source of regulation may well encourage further acceptance
of the Deterfet rule.
However, such a result need not compel the conclusion that since a division
cannot conspire it cannot be a purchaser for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act.
It would seem improbable that a ruling used to enhance the practical efficacy of
antitrust regulation on the one hand could be used as the sole basis for frustrating
it on the other. Moreover, the absence of an alternative provision which explicitly
covers dual distribution would appear to militate against acceptance in a Robinson-
Patman context of the conclusion reached in intracorporate conspiracy cases.
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less of whether the vertical integration which makes the dual distribu-
tion possible is acquisitional or nonacquisitional.14 Moreover, such
anticompetitive conduct may be proscribed in its incipiency under
section 7 of the Clayton Act 15 if the integration is acquisitional.10
Beyond the purview of these provisions, however, are those situations
in which dual distribution, effected through nonacquisitional integra-
tion, has not achieved monopolistic proportions. The apparent in-
crease in dual distribution achieved through such nonacquisitional
integration coupled with the pervasiveness of the resulting abuse has
created a need for effective control in these instances as well.17 While
legislative solutions have been proposed, 8 little consideration has
been given to the possibility that the problem may adequately be
resolved within the context of existing antitrust regulation. Conse-
quently the focus of the following analysis is to determine whether
such control may effectively be achieved through the price dis-
crimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
See generally 6A A. Comm, CONTRACTS § 1417 (1962); Adelman, Integration and Anti-
trust Policy, 61 HARv. L. REv. 27, 50-53 (1949); Adelman, Effective Competition and
the Antitrust Laws, 61 HAsv. L. Rav. 1289, 1312-22 (1948); Kessler & Stem, supra,
note 5, at 89-90; Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and
Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce
Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act?, 11 FED. B.J. 130 (1951); Rahl, Conspiracy
and the Anti-trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 766 (1950); Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. REv.
253, 256 (1958); Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1006, 1009-12 (1952).
1, See note 5 supra.
1515 US.C. § 18 (1964).
1 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
'
T See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Select Comm. on Small
Business, The Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and Related Vertical
Integration, supra note 6, at 1581-87.
1-8 15 U.S.C. §§ 2 (a) (d), (e) (1964). Several amendments to Robinson-Patman have
been proposed under which dual distribution could be regulated. S. 2640, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); S. 2641, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1107, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1968); S. 1108, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968); H.R. 8559, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1968); H.R. 8562, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); S. 1842, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); S. 1843, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1844, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
It should be noted, however, that, although the drafters of the proposed legisla-
tion in presentation to Congress stipulated that the Robinson-Patman Act in its
present form is not capable of dealing with dual distribution, 111 CONG. REc. 8,432
(daily ed. April 28, 1965) (remarks of Representative Roosevelt); II CoNG. REc. 8,542
(daily ed. April 28, 1965) (remarks of Senator Long), and attributed the same
position to the FTC and the Antitrust Division, 111 CONG. Rac. 8,432 (daily ed.
April 28, 1965) (remarks of Representative Roosevelt), neither the drafters nor either
of these agencies appear, during subsequent hearings, to have considered the point
as settled. In fact, one of the main foci of inquiry which the drafters suggested in
recommending the bills to legislative committee was whether the then existing law
could adequately deal with the problem. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Dual Distribution,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1965).
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THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY
Robinson-Patman proscribes price discrimination between differ-
ent purchasers where the effect may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion.'9 Whether the prohibition is available as a limitation on dual
distribution depends initially upon whether the distributing division
can be deemed a purchaser for purposes of the Act.20 While there
have been isolated instances in which a court has disposed of the
purchaser issue solely on the notions of sale and title passing,2' most
- 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a), (d), (e) (1964). Section 2 (a): "It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers . . . where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrim-
ination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in
cost .... And provided further, that nothing herein contained shall prevent persons
engaged in selling goods ... from selecting their own customers in bona fide trans-
actions and not in restraint of trade. Section 2 (d): "It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value
to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce
as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or
through such customer . . . unless such payment or consideration is available on
proportionately equal terms to all other customers competing in distribution of
such products or commodities." Section 2 (e): "It shall be unlawful for any person to
discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser . . . by contracting
to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or
facilities . . . upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionately equal
terms."
20See Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939); Reines Dis-
tribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Wholesale Auto
Supply Co. v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 221 F. Supp. 935 (D.N.J. 1963); Sorrentino v. Glen-
Gery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa., 1942).
One proposed Robinson-Patman amendment, S. 1842, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965)
("A bill to amend the Clayton Act to prohibit vertically integrated companies
from engaging in discriminatory practices against independent producers and dis-
tributors"), was intended to make the Act expressly applicable to vertically integrated
enterprises to the same extent, id. § 2A, and with the same limitations and defenses as
were available under the Clayton Act to nonintegrated enterprises, id. § 2A (c> (3). This
result was sought to be achieved through a declaration that the producer and the "re-
lated establishment," id., shall be deemed a seller and purchaser respectively, even
though they are part of the same company. Moreover, the proscription would have
applied to the actual extension of the discriminatory treatment by the producer as well
as to the inducement of the receipt of the same. Id. § 2A (c). This portion of the bill
does no more than declare that the provisions of the Act in its present form are
applicable to cases involving dual distribution and as such adds nothing by way of
more effective regulation.
21See Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1955). cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Loren Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Clark Mfg. Co.,
241 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1965), aff'd, 360 F.2d 913, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966).
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courts have responded more perceptively, especially when a failure to
find purchaser status would have rendered the Act impotent against
a distribution technique susceptible of widespread use. Accordingly,
when manufacturers have sold to nonfavored retailers through whole-
salers, while selling directly to favored customers at lower prices,
courts have relied on the manufacturer's control over the transaction
between the wholesaler and the nonfavored retailer to conclude
that the retailer was an indirect purchaser.22 Similarly, courts have
indicated that the exercise of dominion and control by the manu-
facturer over the wholesaler, often a subsidiary of the manufacturer,
is sufficient to constitute the manufacturer and the wholesaler a
unitary seller,23 thus enabling the court to find competing pur-
chasers on the retail level. In still other cases, courts have considered
the independent wholesaler and the retailer a single unit for pur-
poses of the Act, thus rendering the retailer a direct purchaser.
24
22 K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): "An
indirect purchaser may come within section 2 when the manufacturer deals directly
with him in promoting the sale of his product and exercises control over the terms
on which he buys." Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 546 (1937): "A retailer
is nonetheless a purchaser though he buys indirectly if, as here, the manufacturer
deals with him directly in promoting the sale of his products and exercises control
over the terms upon which he buys." See Purolator Prods. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874
(7th Cir. 1965); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Dentists' Supply
Co., 37 F.T.C. 345 (1943); Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940); cf. Elizabeth Arden, Inc.
v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
28 See Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956); Baim & Blank, Inc. v.
Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). However, if the manufacturer sells
directly only to favored customers, forcing others who wish to handle its products to
deal through independent wholesalers at higher prices, the courts have been unable
to afford relief. In Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., supra, a case involving such a
distribution arrangement, the court held that since the manufacturer lacked sufficient
dominion and control over the subsidiary, the retailer who purchased from the
subsidiary was not a purchaser from the manufacturer. Thus, there were not two
purchasers from the same seller and no violation of the Act could be found. See also
Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 129 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass.
1955); Merck & Co. v. Bronx Drug Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 78,794 (S.D.N.Y.). The courts
may have been less anxious to broaden the scope of the Act in these cases in the
belief that the refusal to deal is likely to be the result of concerted activity between
the manufacturer and its subsidiary and therefore subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Moreover, it is unlikely that, absent concerted activity, the courts would be willing to
make the manuffcturer responsible for the pricing policies of independent wholesalers
over which he exerts no control.
2See Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966) (jobbers create dummy
wholesaler to obtain wholesale discount); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons v. FTC, 347
F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (retailer creates dummy subsidiary wholesaler to obtain
wholesale discount); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1009 (1966); General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311
(7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923 (1965).
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This judicial consolidation is not without justification; for character-
istically in these cases, a single retailer or jobber, or a group of them,
has established a dummy wholesaler which buys from the manufac-
turer at the wholesale discount thereby allowing the participating
retailers to undercut competitors.25
The above cases demonstrate that the courts have been most
ingenious in their efforts to prevent circumvention of the Robinson-
Patman Act through deviations in traditional business patterns, and
further that considerations of a more functional nature actually de-
termine what appears to be essentially a conceptual issue. In marked
contrast to this approach is the only case which has considered the
purchaser issue in a dual distribution context, though failing to
recognize it as such. In Reines Distributors, Incorporated v. Ad-
miral Corporation,26 Admiral invoiced merchandise to its Newark
distributing branch at a price lower than that at which it sold to
Reines, a franchised distributor of Admiral products competing with
the Newark division in the New York metropolitan area. Unable to
compete with the prices quoted by Newark, Reines brought suit
under section 2 (a), (d), and (e)27 of the Robinson-Patman Act,
alleging that Admiral discriminated in favor of Newark in the prices
charged and in the services rendered. The branch was initially
operated as a division of Admiral and was eventually incorporated as
a wholly owned subsidiary for tax purposes, but it was later rein-
stated as a division when the tax advantage dissolved.
28
Prior to hearing the substance of the claim, the district court in
a preliminary decision passed favorably on Reines' petition to have
the purchaser issue considered separately.29 On reaching the pur-
chaser issue the court, reasoning that the substance rather than the
form of the intracorporate relationship should govern,80 found that
25 Another facet of the purchaser issue is the requirement that the plaintiff must
be an actual and not merely a potential purchaser. See Package Closure Corp. v.
Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944) (prospective purchaser); Shaw's, Inc. v.
Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939) (refusal to deal excluded); United
States v. Borden Co., 111 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. I1. 1953), modified, 347 U.S. 514 (1954)
(one sale insufficient). However, the rule has been subject to exception. See
Aluminum Co. of America v. Tandet, 235 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1964) (no actual
purchase necessary).
2" 256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2' See note 19 supra for text of statute.
28 256 F. Supp. at 585.
29 Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 257 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
80 256 F. Supp. at 585.
"the operation of [the Newark branch] ... was interlocked with the
home office in Chicago to such a degree that Newark could not be
deemed a separate entity."3' This conclusion that Newark was not
a purchaser as contemplated by the Act was premised upon several
factors: Newark's managers were under the control of Admiral;
Admiral's approval was requisite to Newark's extending credit to one
of its customers; the division's books were regularly audited by
agents of Admiral; Newark's bank account was controlled by Ad-
miral; Newark's employees were paid by Admiral; Newark was not
permitted to dump goods on the market for quick sale; and except in
certain circumstances, Newark was unable either to reject the mer-
chandise sent to it by Admiral or to set prices3 2
This separate entity test, which is apparently based on notions of
dominion and control,38 clearly does no more than describe the
essential nature of the corporate division, and thereby effectively
excludes from the scope of the Act the vertically integrated firm en-
gaged in dual distribution.84 By mechanically employing a test
generated by functional considerations in a distinguishable context,
the court overlooked the basis upon which the decision should be
made. The considerations underlying the decision are more properly
whether the failure to find purchaser status will exempt from regula-
tion a distribution technique susceptible of widespread use, and.
whether such a technique may be utilized to produce the anticompeti-
tive effects which the Ac was intended to prevent. 5 Since the wide-
31 Id. at 584.
"Id.
3 Id. at 585.
81"The sections involved herein of the Robinson-Patman Act when considered in
relation to injury to competitors of a favored buyer (the so-called secondary line
competition case) seem directed at discrimination by a seller caused by the size and
strength of an independent buyer." Id. at 584. It is interesting to note, however,
that the court did not stumble on the most obvious conceptual difficulty, namely, that
it is not possible for someone to sell to himself. See Adelman, Integration and
Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 51 (1949): "The stubborn fact that nobody
can charge himself anything is too simple to be impressive." See also Comment,
53 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 253, 256 (1958).
35The court in Reines seems to have believed that the applicability of Robinson-
Patman to the dual distribution technique could be determined independently of
the overall antitrust policies reflected in the Sherman Act: "While this position seems
logical in Sherman Act cases, the focus here is on the purposes of Robinson-Patman
and the substance of the relevant transactions in this case in relation to those
purposes." 256 F. Supp. at 583. It is well established, however, that the Act should
be interpreted to coincide with and effectuate the Sherman Act. Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953): "[I]t is our duty to reconcile [Robinson-
Patman] . . . with the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Con-
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spread use of the dual distribution technique would seem apparent,8
the primary consideration in determining the applicability of
Robinson-Patman becomes whether dual distribution is capable of
producing those discriminatory acts sought to be proscribed by it.
THE THEORETICAL BASIS: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS
Section 2 (a) of the Act3 7 proscribes price discrimination3 by one
gress."; FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 406 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting): "It is also incumbent upon us to seek to rationalize the four
statutes toward a common end and make of them, to the extent that what Congress
has written permits, a harmonious body of law." See also United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 337 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1949); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922). Some courts, however, have recognized the difficulty of
such an endeavor. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., supra (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); FTC v. Rubberoid Co., 843 U.S. 470, 483 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951). Nevertheless,
the Clayton Act and its Robinson-Patman amendment have traditionally been con-
sidered as functional auxilliaries of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963) (§7 Clayton Act); United States
v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 853 U.S. 586, 597 (1957) (same); Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, supra at 249 (Robinson-Patman); United States v. National City Lines, Inc.,
334 U.S. 573, 580-87 (1948) (§ 12 Clayton Act); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., supra at 355 (§ 3 Clayton Act); Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie
Co., 349 F.2d 122, 149 & n.28 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 386 U.S. 685 (1967)
(Robinson-Patman); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir.
1955) (same); Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d
163, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) (§ 7 Clayton Act); Balian Ice Cream
166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) (§ 7 Clayton Act); Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796, 800 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356
(9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956) (Robinson-Patman).
See Purolator Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), in which the court
considered price discrimination and anticompetitive effects before deciding the
purchaser issue.
30 See note 6 supra.
87For text of the Robinson-Patman Act see note 19 supra.
31 The courts have consistently refused to find price discrimination where the same
price is charged and no other discriminatory tactics are present. See FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch Corp., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956); Klein v. Lionel, 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), abfd, 237
F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956). Some courts have even gone so far as to say that where some
consumers are charged less than a retailer, there is no price discrimination if the
retailer could not have competed even if the same price were to be charged, see
Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959), though it
is recognized that charging the same price does not always foreclose one's ability to
compete in these cases, see Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp.
345, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). A growing number of cases, however, have found price
discrimination where the same price was charged but "indirect" discriminatory
tactics were employed. See notes 45-49 infra and accompanying text.
It should also be noted that a different result may be obtained depending upon
whether the activity amounts to an indirect price discrimination, which falls under
§ 2(a), or discriminatory payments or services and facilities, which falls under §§ 2(d)
and (e). Under the former, cost justification and good faith meeting of competition
seller between two or or more purchasers if such discrimination
may39 substantially lessen competition40 on any of three competitive
defenses are available while under the latter they are not. Another distinguishing feature
appears to be whether the discrimination takes place in the original sale or is involved
in subsequent resale by the purchaser; the former is controlled by § 2 (a) and the latter
by §§ 2 (d) and (e). See General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 814-15, 828 (1956); Carpel
Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581, 602 (1951); New England Confectionery Co., 46
F.T.C. 1041, 1059-60 (1949). See generally D. BAUM, supra note 8, at 21-22; C. EDWARDS,
THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw 286-348 (1959); W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 11-101 (1963); F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE Ron-
INSON-PATMAN Aar 87-107 (1962).
Functional discounts, a "traditional pricing technique by which sellers compensated
buyers for expenses incurred by the latter in assuming certain distributive functions
[and] .... provided for graduated discounts to customers classified in accordance with
their place in the distribution chain, namely, wholesaler, retailer and consumer in
diminishing amounts," Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169, 207 (1955), are, however, recog-
nized as permissible under the Act. "Inasmuch as traditional discounts of this type,
as any other price differentials, remained lawful under the Robinson-Patman Act
unless engendering adverse effects on competition, the ordinary discounts to wholesalers
and retailers were considered entirely legal." Id.
However, Congress as well as the courts has refused to require functional discounts,
even in those cases where the same price charged to functionally distinct purchasers
results in reduced competitiveness on the part of one of the purchasers. Proposed
amendments to the definition of price discrimination sought to compel price adjust-
ments in these situations. H.R. 10304, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. 10305, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. 10640, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. 10999, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958); H.R. 11409, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The proposed bill was criticized
by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department on two grounds: (1) the provision
forced the seller to control the price relationships of independent distributors-a result
which is contrary to antitrust objectives. See Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, Functional Discounts, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51
(1958); (2) such a rule could easily be circumvented by the establishment of a jobber
between the manufacturer and the wholesaler. Id.
so 15 U.S.C. § 2 (a) (1964). See note 19 supra. Failure to allege lessened competition
or a tendency to lessen competition will cause dismissal of the action. See Hill v.
Linton, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 63,991 (N.D. 111. 1950). Early cases evidenced a disagreement
among the courts as to whether the test for potential competitive injury is a "reason-
able possibility" or a "reasonable probability." Compare Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC,
324 U.S. 726, 738, 742 (1945), with FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 55-56 (1948)
(Jackson, J., dissenting in part). Courts have since tended toward the "reasonable
probability" test. See Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th Cir.
1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam); National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825,
835 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957). Two cases applied
both without deciding which one was correct. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347
F.2d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1009 (1966); E. Edelmann & Co. v.
FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). Some courts still
adhere to the "reasonable possibility" test. See Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block
& Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
It would seem that, practically, the distinction is merely semantic since what may
satisfy the "reasonable possibility" test in one case may well satisfy the "reasonable
probability" test in another.
Testimony of lack of actual effect on competition is not conclusive. See E. Edelmann
& Co. v. FTC, supra at 155; Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 708 (9th
Cir. 1964). But see American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
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377 U.S. 954 (1963); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961).
These cases have been criticized as "changing the statutory standard" because they
"may be galvanized into a weapon by those who would limit the thrust of the
Robinson-Patinan Act." D. BAUM, supra note 8, at 19-20.
It is well settled, however, that the statutory language does not encompass a "mere
possibility" even in those jurisdictions which accept the "reasonable possibility" test.
See Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, supra; Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, supra; E.
Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, supra. Similarly, a de minimus rule is also present which
prevents application of the Act in those cases where the anticompetitive effect is
"temporary" or "minimal." See Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122,
150 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 386 U.S. 685 (1967); American Oil Co. v.
FTC, supra at 105-06 (gasoline price war); Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co. v.
FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); Borden Co.
v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953, 957 (7th Cir. 1964); Hill v. Linton, supra. See also Albert H.
Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
Predatory intent is neither determinative nor necessary, but it is relevant in deter-
mining whether a given discrimination may substantially lessen competition. See
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 369 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 991 (1956): "[I]ntent is not an essential factor to a § 2 (a) violation, although,
if the intent . . . were found to exist, it might tend to render the injury probable.";
see H. J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). It should be noted that in primary line cases predatory intent has been a sub-
stantial consideration in finding a § 2 (a) violation. See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co., 348 U.S. 115, 116-17 (1954); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel
Co., supra at 956; Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1957). One
court has intimated that predatory intent was a prerequisite for § 2 (a) primary line
violations. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, supra at 842-43. A recent FTC decision, how-
ever, found a § 2 (a) violation where intent was lacking: "[T]he test for finding com-
petitive injury on the primary, or seller's level, in the absence of predatory intent, is
whether the evidence shows significant diversion of business from the discriminator's
competitors to the discriminator or diminishing profits to competitors resulting either
from the diversion of business or from the necessity of meeting the discriminator's
lower prices, provided that these immediate actual effects portend either a financial
crippling of those competitors, a possibility of an anticompetitive concentration of.
business in larger sellers, or a significant reduction of the number of sellers in the
see H.J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
(emphasis added). See generally F. ROWE, supra note 38, at 144-50.
40 There has been substantial controversy over whether the mere injury to a single
competitor is sufficient to establish a § 2 violation. Although statements in the con-
gressional reports concerning the Act would arguably indicate that the Act proscribes
all injuries to competition, see S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); H.R.
REp. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1936), the courts have not seen fit to give it
such a broad interpretation: "The protection intended to be afforded by the statute is
directed to the preservation of competition. The statute's concern with the individual
competitor is but incidental," American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964) (emphasis added). "The Act is really referring to
the effect upon competition not merely upon competitors .... In this respect § 2 (a)
must be read in conformity with the public policy of preserving competition, but it
is not concerned with mere shifts of business between competitors. It is concerned
with substantial impairment of the vigor or health of the contest for business, regardless
of which competitor wins or loses." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840
(7th Cir. 1961); accord, Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269
F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); see Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
levels.4 1 The language of the statute,42 its structure,4 and the myriad
types of practices found to be discriminatory thereunder 4 indicate a
legislative intent and a determined judicial effort not to allow the
Act to be circumvented by manipulation of the large number of fac-
tors present in the complex market relationships which exist today.
Consequently, the courts have found many practices which are not
in themselves price discriminations to be sufficiently equivalent to
justify application of the statutory prohibition. Hence where manu-
facturers have charged the same price to competing purchasers while
at the same time favoring one of them with such extra benefits as
In a given case, however, injury to a competitor may indeed reflect a potential injury
to competition. See HJ. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452,
463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,
supra at 954. However, the cases which assert the injury-to-competition test are those
in which the discriminaiton was found not to be actionable; whereas those cases finding
§ 2 violations do not inquire beyond injury to the competitor. This approach perhaps
reveals a belief that injury to a competitor is in all but extreme cases a true indicator
of reasonably probable injury to competition. It may be, however, that the courts are
unwilling to complicate the Robinson-Patman Act with the complex considerations
presented when the actual effect on competition is the issue under the Sherman Act.
This reluctance may tend to make reconciliation of the two acts considerably more
difficult.
1Sections 2(d) and (e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 (d), (e) (1964), do not permit the defenses
present in § 2 (a), namely cost justification and good faith meeting of competition. It
has been argued that the purpose behind the distinction was to force sellers to confine
their discriminations to price differentials which can more readily be detected, thereby
making the cost defense capable of more accurate evaluation. See D. BAUM, supra
note 8, at 50. The general philosophy behind §§ 2 (d) and (e) was to remove any loop-
holes through which the seller could effect a discrimination which the Act might not
otherwise reach. See H.R. RE. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1936). See also
H.R. REp. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (conference report). The courts have
followed this interpretation. "The purpose of the section here involved was to eliminate
all discrimination under the guise of payments for advertising or promotional services
and Congress employed language that would cover any evasive methods." P. Lorillard
Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439, 443 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959). For an ex-
haustive treatment of the restrictions on some forms of indirect favoritism, see G. FE.D-
MAN & B. ZORN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT: ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES
(1948).
2". .. where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a)
(1964). Thus, there are three levels of competition protected by the Act: primary line
competition between sellers or, in Robinson-Patman cases, between the discriminator
and his competitors; secondary line competition between the buyer who is the target of
the discrimination and his competitors; tertiary line competition between customers of
the buyer.
's The statute proscribes both direct and indirect discriminations. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (a) (1964).
"See note 38 supra.
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freight allowances, 45 interest free loans, 46 free samples and cumulative
quantity discounts,47 or purchase options, 48 the courts have consis-
tently applied the Act,49 apparently on the theory that such tactics
result in lower costs to the favored purchaser.
This tendency to look to the practical effect of the manufacturer's
marketing techniques has prevailed in the search for potential anti-
competitive effects on all three competitive levels. Original section
2 of the Clayton Act, 50 which was amended by Robinson-Patman, was
designed to prevent geographic price cutting which effected primary
line competition.51 Typically, the manufacturer would lower the
price of its product in an area of sharp competition below that which
local competitors could effectively meet. The price cut would then
be supported by higher prices charged in areas where competition
was slight or nonexistent.52 With the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act, however, this tactic became just one of the several forms
of prohibited price discrimination. 53  Although to the present time
4 See, e.g., Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y.
1960).
"6 See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 1952-53 Trade Cas. 68,230 (N.D. Ill. 1953)
(consent decree).
'7 See, e.g., National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. 111. 1945).
48 See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
"0 Other examples of nonprice favoritism included coupons redeemable for cash, see,
e.g., Idaho Canning Co., 58 F.T.C. 657 (1961), and extended terms for procurement of
trade discounts, see, e.g., National Grain Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 684 (1941). See note 38
supra.
50 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
"1 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 542-45 (1960).
52 Id. at 540-41.
"' See id. at 543-45. Prior to consideration of the Anheuser-Busch price cutting case,
it was requisite under the Robinson-Patman Act that the purchasers involved be com-
petitors. See Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1, 10 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950). This rule made application of the Act to price
cutting difficult, since such cases did not typically involve competing purchasers. In the
face of this dilemma the courts opted to avoid exempting this anticompetitive pricing
tactic and excepted the required competition in these cases. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1960): "It is, of course, quite true . . . that the 1936
Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act were motivated principally by con-
gressional concern over the impact upon secondary-line competition of the burgeon-
ing mammoth purchasers, notably chain stores. However, the legislative history of these
amendments leaves no doubt that Congress was intent upon strengthening the Clayton
Act provisions, not weakening them, and that it was no part of Congress' purpose to
curtail the pre-existing applicability of § 2 (a) to price discriminations affecting primary-
line competition." Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Atlas Bldg.
Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1957).
This result again demonstrates the flexibility with which the courts have approached
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this geographic price cutting has been the only context in which the
courts have considered primary level anticompetitive effects, this
application does Serve to demonstrate that such an inquiry is possible
under the Act.
Though the main legislative concern in the enactment of Robin-
son-Patman was with the plight of the small seller generally, 54 the
most immediate impact of the discrimination inherent in dual dis-
tribution is in many cases on the independent wholesaler. Conse-
quently the search for anticompetitive effects is frequently on the
secondary level. The most typical form of favoritism on this level
is the same as that found on the tertiary level: discounts to quantity
purchasers. When lower prices are offered to large wholesalers, a
Robinson-Patman violation will result unless the variance reflects an
actual cost difference. 55
Traditional tertiary level cases have involved the use of coercive
buying power by large chain stores.56 Typically, a large chain store
forced discriminatory price and service concessions by threatening
to cease purchasing from the supplier. The small competing retailer
who was unable to exert similar pressure was forced to pay the higher
price. A realization that the original section 2 of the Clayton Act
could not cope with this problem, 57 coupled with the scope of the
abuse revealed by the Chain Store Investigation, 5 provided the pri-
mary impetus for enactment of the Robinson-Patman Amendment.
While the courts generally need not seek potential competitive
injury beyond the level at which the discrimination is effected, they
will consider the effect upon other levels when necessary. Hence in
price cutting cases, where the discrimination takes place on the
secondary level, judges may look to the primary level for anti-
cases where the issue has been the applicability of the Act to a particular distribution
technique.
"See W. PATMAN, supra note 38, at 7-10.
"See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
See W. PATmAN, supra note 38, at 54, 126-29. Chain store purchasers would not
appear to represent the purest form of tertiary competitor, since they often purchase
directly from producers, thereby competing with wholesalers for advantageous delivery
schedules and other services.
57 The permissibility of unlimited quantity discounts and the then current form of
the good-faith-meeting-of-competition defense presented easy avenues for circumvention
of the Clayton Act proscriptions. See C. EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 5-12.
"s THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION,
S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
1010 [Vol. 1967: 996
Vol. 1967: 996] DUAL DISTRIBUTION 1011
competitive effects. 59 Similarly, in other secondary level discrimina-
tion cases relief may be granted to a wholesaler even though the
alleged injury occurred at the retail level. In Krug v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corporation,6° a wholesaler instituted a
Robinson-Patman action alleging competitive injury to his customers
because the manufacturer was selling directly to retailers at prices
lower than those charged to the plaintiff wholesaler, whose customers
competed with the favored retailers. The district court held that "it
would seem to make no difference that [the wholesaler's] injury was
not suffered by his inability to compete with others on his own dis-
tributive level but by the failure of his customers to meet the com-
petition of another immediate purchaser from the manufacturer." 6'
The Krug case is merely indicative of the responsiveness to business
realities which the courts have reflected toward both the inquiry as to
potential anticompetitive effects and to the price discrimination
issue. Conceivably the courts would be equally receptive to proof
that a novel distributive technique such as dual distribution may be
capable of producing the same results.
A firm engaged in dual distribution is clearly capable of price
discrimination in its conventional forms. The manufacturer may
discriminate between two independent purchasers at a marketing
level other than that at which it undertakes dual distribution. More-
over, even on the level where it is engaged in favored distribution to
its own division, a manufacturer can discriminate between inde-
pendent purchasers. The present inquiry is not, however, whether
price discrimination can be found concurrently with dual distribu-
tion, but rather whether this marketing technique can produce
such discrimination. Consequently, the focus of the inquiry is more
properly whether the techniques employed by manufacturers in
favoring their division distributor over independent customer-com-
petitors constitute price discrimination as it is conceived by the
courts in other contexts.
One of the most obvious discriminatory techniques available to
the firm practicing dual distribution is cost allocation among the
various levels of production and distribution. While the effect of
11 Cf. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 863 U.S. 536, 542-44 (1960); E.B. Muller v. FTC,
142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
80 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
01 Id. at 236.
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such allocation on the overall profit of an integrated enterprise is
slight, its effect on independent customer competitors may be dev-
astating. An important precedent in an analogous area is provided
by United States v. Aluminum Company of America.6 2  Alcoa,
which controlled over ninety percent of the virgin aluminum ingot
market in the United States,63 was also a fabricator of aluminum
sheet in competition with independent fabricators who purchased its
aluminum ingot. Since the price it charged the integrated fabri-
cators was not the real determinant of the overall profit realized from
the finished product, Alcoa allocated most of its costs, including part
of the fabrication costs, to the price of ingot. By this device Alcoa
raised the cost of ingot to a point at which the independent sheet
rollers who bought the ingot "could not pay the expenses of 'rolling'
the 'sheet' and make a living profit out of the price at which 'Alcoa'
itself sold 'sheet.' " The only difference between Alcoa and dual
distribution situations is that in the latter the purchasers are whole-
salers and retailers rather than fabricators. Consequently, a manu-
facturer can favor its division distributor by allocating part of the cost
of distribution to the primary level. Although both the division and
the independent are "charged" the same price, the independent dis-
tributor is made to absorb costs not fairly allocable to the product he
receives.
If Robinson-Patman were only interpreted to require a price
difference this discriminatory treatment would be effectively ex-
empted from proscription until it actually achieved monopoly pro-
portions. However, the courts, as has been noted,65 have gone beyond
mere price difference to find Robinson-Patman violations where,
ab 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
as Id. at 425.
64 Id. at 437. The Alcoa scheme can be illustrated thusly: if the selling price of sheet
aluminum is $10.00 per 100 feet, the cost of the ingot necessary to produce one hundred
feet of sheet $5.00, and the cost of fabrication $4.00, with a profit of $1.00, Alcoa could
raise the cost of ingot to $5.75, $.75 of which is transferred from the cost of fabrica-
tion, and still sell the sheet aluminum for $10.00 with a $1.00 profit. However, the
independent fabricator who is forced to pay the extra S.75 for the ingot, in order to
compete with Alcoa, must reduce his profit to $.25 per 100 feet. If Alcoa raised the
cost of ingot to or above $6.00, the independent fabricator would realize no profit.
Thus, though cost allocation is of little significance to the integrated firm, it is of vital
importance to its customer-competitors. Where these activities have the intent or
effect of monopolization, they may be prosecuted under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at
438.
Or See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
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despite price similarity, some other discriminatory tactic yields lower
costs for the favored purchaser. Comparable analysis would demand
an identification of discrimination in the dual distribution context
when the same price is charged, but cost allocation is used to undercut
the independent wholesaler. The only difference between these
two situations is in form: in the usual case the discrimination results
in lower costs to the favored purchaser, whereas in the dual distribu-
tion case it results in higher actual costs to the nonfavored purchaser.
It is, of course, difficult to draw a perfect analogy from cases where
the manufacturer discriminates in favor of one independent distribu-
tor over another, employing such tactics as purchase options6 and
free samples, 67 to cases in which the manufacturer favors an owned
and controlled division, using the device of cost manipulation. How-
ever, the difficulty arises only from the difference in the form of the
intercorporate and intracorporate relationships involved and not
from the substance of the practices employed. 8  Consequently, the
courts would be in harmony with present case law if they were to find
an indirect price discrimination by the manufacturer in this context.
Even if dual distribution is shown to produce price favoritism,
there can be no remedy unless that discrimination may have the
potential anticompetitive effects sought to be prevented by the Act.6 9
Significantly, the adverse effects of such discrimination can be ob-
served on all three levels of competition. On the secondary level
00 See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739-42 (1945).
'7 See National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
08 Another proposed amendment, S. 1844, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), "A bill to
amend the Clayton Act to prohibit vertically integrated companies from engaging
in anticompetitive pricing practices," was intended to proscribe one of the injurious
activities made possible by dual distribution, namely, the "price squeeze." In this
situation, the integrated firm allocates an artificial percentage of cost and profit to the
level upon which the independent customer competes, thus leaving him little or no
profit margin at that level. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Dual Distribution, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11-12, 100 (1965). The bill required that "adequate and fair differentials" must be
maintained between the prices charged upon those levels at which the integrated enter-
prise competes with independent competitors. S. 1844, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §2A
(1965). Such a scheme is dangerously analogous to requiring functional discounts-
a measure which both the courts and Congress have evidenced great reluctance to
embrace since such techniques tend to freeze prices, a result which in itself is anti-
competitive. See note 41 supra. In addition to the possible anticompetitive results, the
provision strikes at the effect-artificial cost allocation to one level of production or
distribution-rather than the cause of the squeeze. Such allocation can arguably be
described as an "indirect price discrimination" in appropriate cases, and thereby be
subject to proscription under the present Robinson-Patman Act.
10 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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these possible detriments are both immediate and readily apparent.70
Since the competitive cost of the product to the independent dis-
tributor is greater than that to the division, the independent will
either be forced to sell to retailers at a higher price or to charge the
same price but operate with a lower margin of profit.71 In the former
situation inability to meet the division's price will reduce the in-
dependent's share of the market. Similarly, in the latter situation the
lower margin of profit may reduce efficiency and thereby result in a
loss of sales. Though these consequences may not inevitably occur
in every instance where discrimination is employed, they do suggest
that such effects are possible.
In those cases in which this indirect discrimination results in in-
jury to the independent wholesaler, both existing and potential
primary level competition may also be adversely affected.j 2 Within
most industries there are likely to be small, competing manufacturers
which cannot integrate and must depend upon independent dis-
tributors for efficient, competitive distribution.73 Utilization of the
dual distribution technique by an integrated firm to reduce the dis-
tributor's absolute profits or his profit margin can deprive the smaller
producers of quality outlets. This result is especially likely in an
industry where consumer preference for the integrated firm's product
requires all wholesalers to handle it if they are to survive.74 The
anamolous situation created by a failure to apply Robinson-Patman
in these cases is plain. In order to remain competitive, the small
competitor, unable to integrate by internal expansion, 5 is forced to
attempt integration by contract,76 but it thereby places itself under
the full thrust of the Act. The integrated competitor, however, re-
mains exempt.
TO See HOUSE SELECr COMMITTEE ON SMALL BusiNss, TnE IMPAcT UPON SMALL Bust-
NEss oF DUAL DISmIBnION AND RELATED VERTICAL INTEGRATION, H.R. REtP. No. 1943,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).71 See C. EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 532.
72 A reduction of the independent wholesaler's volume of sales can adversely affect
the distribution costs of competing manufacturers. Cf. Kessler & Stem, Competition,
Contract &t Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1959).
7s See J. BAIN, BARuuEas To NEW CoMrEITION (1962); cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 386 US. 568 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332-34 (1962).
"' See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Parke Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d
867 (2d Cir. 1962).
75 See note 5 supra.
TO Id.
The adverse effect on the independent distributor may also injure
potential competition by creating an absolute cost advantage for the
integrated enterprise which, in turn, deters the entry of new pro-
ducers into the market.77 To the extent that vertical integration and
dual distribution may be used effectively to weaken existing inde-
pendent distribution outlets, or eliminate them entirely, the potential
competitor is faced with the prospect of developing its own outlets.
The difficulty of raising the capital for such an undertaking might in
itself be an effective barrier to entry.78  Moreover, because the manu-
facturer not only has to be a maker but a seller as well, the prospec-
tive producer who is unsure of the competitiveness of its product
may be unwilling to undertake this additional distributive func-
tion.79
The anticompetitive effect which occurs on tertiary level compe-
tition may be observed in situations where the manufacturer, after
discriminating against the independent wholesaler, allows its division
to sell only to favored retailers. Nonfavored retailers, consequently,
are forced to purchase from the independent wholesalers at higher
prices, thereby depressing competition at the retail level.80 Thus,
dual distribution is capable of producing price discrimination with
consequent anticompetitive effects on all three levels of competition.
Moreover, the orientation of this practice8l and the probability of
77 See Kessler & Stem, supra note 72, at 18; J. BAIN, supra note 73, at 214-15.
Market foreclosure has long been a source of concern in Sherman Act cases, see, e.g.,
United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1948); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and § 7 Clayton Act cases,
see FTC V Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957), involving vertically integrated enterprises.
" Cf. J. MLu.R, UNFAIR COMPETIMON 212 (1941).
70 If the manufacturer chooses to deal with existing, inefficient distributors, it is
faced with higher variable costs. See Kessler & Stern, supra note 72, at 16, 18; cf. J.
MILLER, supra note 78, at 212; Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65
HARV. L. REv. 913, 922 (1952).
8O In Krng v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956), the manu.
facturer was accused of selling directly to retailers at lower prices than those at which
it sold to the plaintiff wholesaler whose customers were in competition with the
favored retailers. The court found that, even where there is no present or potential
effect on the wholesaler's ability to compete on his own level, the Act has been violated
where such discriminations might affect the ability of his customers to compete.
Id. at 235-36.
8 1 In contrast to the majority of traditional Robinson-Patman cases, the discrimina-
tion in dual distribution is stimulated by the interests of the discriminator and not in-
Vol. 1967: 996] DUAL DISTRIBUTION 1015
defensive integration render these effects, when realized, considerably
more devastating. These factors furnish further justification for
bringing this distribution technique within the purview of the Act.
IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE REGULATION
Two significant impediments to the effective application of
Robinson-Patman are the difficulty of exposing discriminatory activ-
ity by the integrated enterprise and the possibility of retaliatory
refusals to deal. The extent to which a firm is integrated will deter-
mine its ability to manipulate costs among the various levels of
production and distribution. Since the more integrated firm has a
smaller proportion of separable costs relative to total costs, it can more
easily disguise discriminatory cost allocation, thus rendering effective
exposure more difficult.82  This problem has been recognized in
Congress in the form of a proposed amendment to Robinson-Patman
which would require all ownership integrated firms to file separate
profit and loss statements for company owned plants and distribution
outlets participating in dual distribution.8 3 This requirement would
duced by the buying power of a third party. However, since the focus of the Act is upon
the existence of discriminatory practices and their anticompetitive effects, see Krug v. In-
ternational Tel. & Tel. Co., 142 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D.N.J. 1956), and not the purpose or
tent with which they were initiated, see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231
F.2d 356, 369 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); H. J. Heinz Co. v.
Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the distinction is of
limited significance.
S2See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HIAv. L. REv. 27, 30 (1949),
quoting NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, COMMITrEE ON PRICE DISCRIMINA-
TION, COST BEHAVIOR AND PRICE POLICY 174 (1943). See also Comment, 53 Nw. U.L.
REv. 253 (1958).8 3 The amendment, "A bill to require certain companies engaged in dual distribution
to disclose separate annual operating data on each of their establishments which
competes with independent customers of such companies in the sale and industrial
use of these products . . . ", S. 1843, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), recognized one of
the most difficult problems appendant to effective regulation of dual distribution under
the Act, namely, the gathering of evidence sufficient to show that within a highly com-
plex and sophisticated intracorporate relationship there exists discriminatory activities
injurious to independent customer-competitors. Section 3(a) of the proposed amend-
ment provides that each firm employing dual distribution shall publish annually
figures reflecting the aggregate dollar amount of its net sales to independent customers
and the dollar amounts or value of net sales or transfers to individual related estab-
lishments. Section 4 provides that the enterprise employing dual distribution must
also publish a "separate annual operating statement" for each of its related establish-
ments which is a party to dual distribution. Such statement shall contain "at least"
total annual net sales; cost of goods sold, including cost of products purchased from
related and nonrelated establishments; operating overhead; and net profit and loss
from operations. Moreover, the operating cost statement shall indicate separately any
subsidization received by the establishment from the company as a whole, or an indi-
vidual related establishment, and it shall also show any capital investment from the
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not only greatly facilitate the exposure of indirect price discrimina-
tions such as those achieved through cost allocation, but would also
encourage suits by private litigants to whom the products of this
disclosure would be available.
Working without the proposed legislation, however, injured
competitors should not find the problem of discovery insuperable.
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by satisfying the
court that there is a reasonable possibility that its competitive dis-
advantage is occasioned by abuse of the dual distribution technique,8 4
the burden could then be placed on the integrated firm to explain
the source and justification of its cost allocations. This smoking-out
rule would achieve substantially the same result as the proposed
legislation while dispensing with the necessity of having every inte-
grated firm file such information.
Another obstacle to effective application of the Act, though not
unique to cases of dual distribution, is the actual or threatened retalia-
tory refusal to deal. This tactic is employed to discourage those in-
jured by the discrimination from bringing suit, to punish those who
do, and thereby to deter others from attempting to sue. The privi-
lege of customer selection embodied in the Colgate85 doctrine and
retained earnings of the company, a related establishment, or the establishment itself.
Section 5 requires that such information be available to the public, either through
the annual stockholders' report, or by filing such information with the FTC.
The obvious advantage of such a scheme is that it provides easy access to crucial
information by both the private litigant and the federal agencies. However, it may
also facilitate price fixing by disclosure of information to competitors. Another difficulty
is presented by the fact that many costs within an integrated enterprise are not
susceptible to allocation to one establishment or another. For example, the executive
officers of the manufacturing establishment may also be executive officers for the
wholesale establishment but may have their salaries expensed to the former. The ques-
tion then becomes what portion of these salaries, if any, should be allocated to the
cost structure of the wholesale establishment for the purpose of disclosure. An even
more difficult situation is presented by advertising expenditures made by the integrated
enterprise on its own behalf and on behalf of the related establishments. To the
extent that such items of non-separable cost are prevalent, any attempt at separation
of cost data in the fashion contemplated by the proposed amendment is impractical
and unrealistic.
8,In determining the content of the prima facie case engendered by the showing
of a reasonable possibility of competitive disadvantage, it is necessary to consider and
balance conflicting policies: the policy of encouraging harmony within the economic
community by avoiding excessive litigation between customers and the policy of
providing effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. The difficulty of such an accom-
modation suggests an ad hoc approach to the problem with the question submitted to
the judge for determination on the facts of each case.
- 250 U.S. 00 (1919). The Colgate Court held that a mere refusal to deal, in the
absence of an agreement between the manufacturer and its customers, could not be a
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included in section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,86 taken liter-
ally, would appear to permit such refusals to deal as an effective
weapon in the discouragement of private suits under the Act. The
scope of the doctrine has, however, been greatly limited by later
decisions.8 7 Consequently, there are now several possible methods
of limiting the effectiveness of refusals to deal as a deterrent to
private litigation while preserving the basic right of customer selec-
tion.
Initially, a preliminary injunction may be granted to restrain,
pending completion of the litigation, the manufacturer from refusing
to deal with the suing distributor. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in House of Materials, Incorporated v. Simplicity Pattern
Company88 refused to uphold such an injunction 9 apparently on the
violation of the Sherman Act, regardless of the reasons underlying the refusal.
Id. at 807. However, the refusal to deal was attacked as part of a price maintenance
scheme.
Later cases have limited the thrust of the Colgate doctrine by expanding the scope
of actionable refusals to deal. In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922),
where the FTC brought an action under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
the Supreme Court upheld the issuance of a cease and desist order because, while
there was no express agreement or contract, the "cooperative methods" used to prevent
anyone from obtaining Beech-Nut products at less than the suggested retail prices
were incompatible with the policies laid down in the Sherman Act. Id. at 454-56. In
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), the Court further restricted
Colgate by making such activity a violation of the Sherman Act, thereby establishing
a basis for private litigation. The types of cooperative activity deemed unlawful by
the courts include: sending out agents to spy on customers, see FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., supra; Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926); do-not-sell
lists, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra; FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
supra; Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 662 (1926); num-
bering and symbol systems to catch price cutters, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
supra; FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra. One circuit court has summed up the
present 'state of the law thusly: "The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through
which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric
simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise." George
W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960).
86"Nothing herein contained shall prevent persons . . . from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a)
(1964).
.
8 T See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); George W. Warner
& Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
"8298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962). The case involved an action for treble damages
under § 2 (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act based on an earlier action, FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), in which the Supreme Court affirmed a cease and desist
order against Simplicity for discriminating in services on behalf of larger customers.
Upon receiving notice of the suit, Simplicity threatened to drop the plaintiff's franchise.
The plaintiff retailer moved for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant from
refusing to deal, alleging that the cancellation was solely a punitive measure intended
to coerce the dropping of the suit and to discourage others from suing. The defendant
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theory that the refusal to deal in that case90 did not present an appro-
priate basis for equitable relief.91 Subsequently, however, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Bergen Drug Company v. Parke, Davis
& Company,92 citing Simplicity as authority,93 ruled that a temporary
injunction could appropriately be granted where refusals to deal
were employed to coerce abandonment of a suit.94 Arguably, the
narrowness of the holding in Simplicity coupled with its expansive
replied that there was nothing in the antitrust laws to prevent such action, relying on
the Colgate doctrine.
89 The district court in P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp.
55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd sub nom., House of Materials v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298
F.2d 867 (2d Cir.1962), had balanced the "strong public policy in favor of permitting
private suitors to maintain causes of action for violation of the anti-trust laws both
on their own and in the public interest," id. at 62, against the privilege of customer
selection weakened by post-Colgate cases, and held that since the latter was being used
"in pursuance of an objective inimical to the purposes and policies of the antitrust
laws .... " id. at 63, the former should prevail. The court also dismissed the argu-
ment that such a refusal to deal was protected by the customer selection proviso of
§ 2 (a) of the Act by finding that the defendant's activities were not bona fide transac-
tions.
90 "[I]n an appropriate case a court might restrain a defendant from attempting to
coerce a plaintiff into discontinuing a suit." 298 F.2d at 871 (dictum).
11 The district court was reversed on the grounds that the refusal to deal was not
part of an antitrust violation and that use of the court's general equity power was not
proper in this case since the refusal to deal "did not have the legal effect of depriving
[plaintiff] of a remedy for past injury." Id. at 872. It would appear that while there
is indeed no legal deprivation of the right to sue, the lower court's recognition of the
actual discouragement warrants consideration and perhaps provides a sound basis for
granting the preliminary relief.
92 207 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
I' Id. at 727.
01 The defendant had terminated dealings with the plaintiff upon learning that he
had instituted a treble damage action. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion which the district court refused. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed: "We think
that the district court, as a court of equity, did possess the power to issue the pre-
liminary injunction." Id. at 726. The court drew an analogy to cases under the
Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964), in which it had granted
preliminary relief compelling the manufacturer to continue dealing with the plaintiff
until the litigation had been concluded. The court also focused upon the importance
of private suits in effective enforcement of antitrust regulation: "Private actions are an
important means of enforcing the antitrust laws of the United States. Such actions
are a vehicle for serving not only the immediate interests of the litigants, but the con-
tinuing interest of the public in a smoothly functioning and unobstructed system of
commerce. Congress voiced its recognition of the importance of private actions by en-
acting special provisions for treble damages and attorneys' fees." Id. at 727-28.
Two provisions in Title 15 of the United States Code expressly aid the private
litigant. Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), formerly 28 Stat. 721 (1914), affords liberal
venue provisions, treble damages, no minimum claim requirement, and recovery costs
of litigation. Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964), formerly 28 Stat. 731 (1914), provides
that a government judgment is prima facie evidence of a violation, and that the statute
of limitations is halted by commencement of the government's suit and for a year there-
after.
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interpretation in Bergen Drug indicate a trend toward greater
acceptance of preliminary injunctions to prevent this coercive use of
refusals to deal.
Such relief, however, is only temporary in nature and thus does
not prevent the seller from refusing to deal after the suit is con-
cluded.95  Although the language of the decisions would seem to
ban post-litigation refusals, in practice only those refusals to deal
which are part of an antitrust violation have been enjoined by the
courts. Moreover, no case involving a private antitrust action has
enjoined a refusal to deal with a particular customer. On the other
hand, a great number of cases permit refusals to deal which are not
appendant to antitrust violations, 6 but these cases may be dis-
tinguished since they involve prospective rather than present cus-
tomers.
Although present law thus does not deem unlawful a refusal to
deal which is not part of an antitrust violation, the injurious effect of
retaliatory refusals in these instances would seem to demand judicial
attention. To permit a manufacturer to refuse to deal with an in-
dependent distributor after the latter had successfully prosecuted a
Robinson-Patman suit against him would circumvent the purpose
of the Act by making the distributor's victory meaningless and
by discouraging future suits by other independent distributors.
Consequently, the manufacturer should be permitted to cancel or to
refuse to renew the independent distributor's franchise only when a
businesg purpose independent of the desire to punish and deter can
be established. 7  Such an approach would encourage private en-
95An injunction will apparently be dissolved once the suit is concluded. It is
arguable, however, that at this point no reason exists for a continuation of the refusal
to deal. All those customers who had causes of action would, by that time, have had
the opportunity to sue under the protection of the injunction, thus removing the
deterrent effect of a refusal. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 1564, 1575-76 (1962).
96 See Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537(1954); Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent
Theater Co., 107 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ohio 1952), aff'd, 216 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1955); United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D.
Minn. 1951); Windsor Theater Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D.
Md. 1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick
Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
97 It has been argued that allowing refusals to deal only when independent business
purposes exist would amount to an unwarranted extension of the remedies provided
by the antitrust laws: "The District Court appears to have found by implication in
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forcement of the antitrust laws while not unduly impinging upon the
privilege of customer selection.9
Aside from preliminary and post trial injunctive relief, a refusal
to deal may be shown to be part of an antitrust violation and thus
within the scope of the Parke Davis rule. While it has been argued
that refusals to deal constitute the most egregious form of price dis-
crimination, 9  the Second Circuit in Simplicity found this argument
unworthy of discussion.100 While the court's inattention may be
justifiable insofar as prospective purchasers are involved,10 the use
of refusals to deal to punish and deter present purchasers can be
viewed as an integral part of the manufacturer's plan of price discrim-
ination, since it reduces the possibility of detection and thus en-
hances the effectiveness of the scheme.10 2  Thus, though retaliatory
Section 4 of the Clayton Act a prohibition against coercing persons who bring treble
damage actions to discontinue them. But we think that such an implication is un-
warranted, for we find nothing in the language or purpose of the statute which sug-
gests that Congress intended to force manufacturers to deal with persons who sue them,
while not forcing them to deal with others." House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 871 n.1l (2d Cir. 1962). However, even assuming that Con-
gress did not intend that franchisees could institute a Robinson-Patman action to force
the manufacturer to continue dealing with them, that fact should not prevent careful
application of the statutory sanctions in those cases in which it is clear that there
exists no legitimate business motive other than a desire to punish and deter. By so
holding the courts would arguably achieve a realistic balance between the policies em-
bodied in the privilege of customer selection and those embodied in the congressional
desire for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws through private enforcement.
98 It may also be argued that refusals to deal in situations in which no independent
business purpose exists constitute an unfair method of competition which may be
eliminated under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1964).
The creation of a public remedy raises the possibility that the courts might extend
relief to private individuals in order to ensure comprehensive enforcement of the
statutory principles. Cf. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
09 See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1133-34 (1949): "[L]ogically complete refusal to
sell is only a refusal to sell at any but a prohibitive price. In practice, moreover, a
complete refusal to sell can often be used with the purpose and effect of price dis-
crimination .... Since refusals to sell are practically and logically extensions of dis-
criminations in price, discriminatory refusals, like discriminatory sales, should be sub-
jected to the criteria of that section." But see Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 847, 848-51 (1955).
100 House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir.
1962).
101 See Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939); Wholesale Auto
Supply Co. v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 221 F. Supp. 935 (D.N.J. 1963); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery
Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
102 Another possible theory of regulation lies in a finding that the refusals to deal
are part of a contract, see United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, 252 U.S. 85 (1920)
(express or implied), combination, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29, 44 (1960), or conspiracy, see United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707 (1944), in restraint of trade, in which case treble damages may be awarded.
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refusals to deal appear to present a significant obstacle to effective
application of Robinson-Patman to dual distribution, the courts are
not without adequate means for controlling them.
CONCLUSION
It would appear that since the integrated firm, through dual dis-
tribution, is capable of effecting those types of practices and causing
those types of anticompetitive effects sought to be prevented by the
Robinson-Patman Act, and moreover, since there do not appear to be
any insuperable barriers to its effective application, the division
should indeed be deemed a purchaser for purposes of the Act. Such
a finding in no way implies that the very existence of dual distribu-
tion violates the Act but rather only that it will be regulated in the
same manner as other distribution techniques.
